Numerous and new factors highlyinter-linked have profoundly changed non-kinetic strategy and made strategytheory partially useless. First of all, we need to keep aware that theglobalization of our economy has made institutions increasingly hybrid asstates become more interdepend. Resulting in a decline of state’s power and thegrowth of private sector, this generated a loss of monopoly on combat forceswhich leave nation-states in highly decentralized forms of warfare. Even if wesaw a utility in strategy theory for non-kinetic strategy, changes have madetheory partly inapplicable theses developing strategies. Secondly, these changes, we havejust evoked, have made theory partly inapplicable to non-kinetic strategies bybringing in new users and transforming the structure. Unlike weapons of thepast, non-kinetic are not restricted to particular actors, therefore are moreaccessible.
This is due to the empowerment of the private sector, for instance,regarding the space industry, private corporations have gained enough capitalto invest and maybe dominate this domain. But it is also due to the increasedavailability of technical skills and tools, in sectors such as cyber, throughonline marketplaces, for example, making the cyber environment accessible tonon-experts. This generates the inclusion of the private sector and independentindividuals or groups (for example, Al Qaida, or a simple hacker) in the policydiscussion. Thus, those new users considerably change the structure ofconflict.
While until the past century, thetraditional structure was interstates conflict, we are now undergoing a majordecline in the number of interstate conflict and the rise of conflict withinstates. This is due to the weakening state with globalization creating a shiftfrom hierarchical patterns of government to broader and more polyarchicalnetworks. The decline of political power has transform war from a rationalpursuit of states into an irrational, unstructured activity, fought not byarmies but by groups with varying motivations. In fact, these new structuresmake strategic theory useless for non-kinetic strategies. For instance,Clausewitz’s Trinity has become incoherent with the actual structure ofconflict, as it is contiguous with the state.
In fact, Clausewitzian Trinity ofWar promotes three aspects; citizens accompanied with their passion, commanderwith their skills, and government with their reason. Though, in thecontemporary world, this principle is challenged, because of because of newusers breaking the structure of the Trinity, people often being the onlyremaining component of it. We can illustrate this with the case of EdwardSnowden, who exposed thousands of classified NSA documents to denounce his owngovernment and its massive surveillance.
In fact, he is the only constituent ofthe Trinity as he managed the skills, the passion and the reason itself. As thenew context in which these emerging strategies are evolving, nonetheless, theirdistinctive nature is also one of the reasons strategy theory is inapplicablein some cases.