Essay, Research PaperRole of The Emperor in Meiji JapanJapan is a society whose civilization is steeped in the traditionsand symbols of the yesteryear: Mt. Fuji, the tea ceremonial, and the sacredobjects of nature revered in Shintoism. Two of the most of importtraditions and symbols in Japan ; the Emperor and Confucianism haveendured through Shogunates, Restorations of imperial regulation, and up topresent twenty-four hours. The leaders of the Meiji Restoration used thesetraditions to derive control over Japan and further their ends ofmodernisation. The Meiji leaders used the symbolism of the Emperor toadd legitimacy to their authorities, by claiming that they were governingunder the & # 8220 ; Imperial Will. & # 8221 ; They besides used Confucianism to keeporder and coerce the Nipponese people to passively accept their regulation.

Nipponese swayers historically have used the symbolism of theImperial Institution to warrant their regulation. The symbolism of theNipponese Emperor is really powerful and is wrapped up in a mix offaith ( Shintoism ) and myths. Harmonizing to Shintoism the currentEmperor is the direct descendant of the Sun Goddess who formed theislands of Japan out of the Ocean in antediluvian times.Footnote1 Harmonizingto these myths the Nipponese Emperor unlike a King is a lifedescendant of the Gods and even today he is thought of as the HighPriest of Shinto. Despite the powerful myths environing Japan & # 8217 ; simperial establishment the Emperor has enjoyed merely figure caput positionfrom 1176 on. At some points during this clip the Emperor was reducedto selling penmanship on the streets of Kyoto to back up the imperialfamily, but normally the Emperor received money based on thekindness of the Shogunate.Footnote2 But despite this obvious powerinstability even the Tokugawa Shogun was at least symbolically below theEmperor in position and he claimed to govern so he could transport out theImperial rule.

Footnote3Within this historical context the Meiji leaders realizedthat they needed to tackle the construct of the Imperial Will inorder to regulate efficaciously. In the old ages taking up to 1868 membersof the Satsuma and Choshu kins were portion of the imperialistresistance. This resistance claimed that the lone manner that Japan couldlast the invasion of the aliens was to beat up around theEmperor.Footnote4 The Imperialists, claimed that the TokugawaShogunate had lost its imperial authorization to transport out the Imperial Willbecause it had capitulated to Western powers by leting them to openup Japan to merchandise. During this clip the thoughts of the imperialistsgained increasing support among Nipponese citizens and intellectualswho taught at freshly established schools and wrote revisionist historybooks that claimed that historically the Emperor had been theswayer of Japan.

Footnote5 The fact that the Tokugawa & # 8217 ; s policy ofopening up Japan to the western universe ran counter to the beliefs ofthe Emperor and was unpopular with the populace made the Tokugawavulnerable to assail from the imperialists. The imperialists pressedtheir onslaught both militarily and from within the Court of Kyoto. Thegreat military government of Edo which until late had been whollypowerful was staggering non because of military failing, or becausethe machinery of authorities had broken but alternatively because theNipponese public and the Shoguns protagonists felt they had lost theImperial Will.Footnote6The terminal of the Tokugawa government shows the power of thesymbolism and myths environing the imperial establishment. Thecaput of the Tokugawa kin died in 1867 and was replaced by the boy ofa Godhead who was a title-holder of Nipponese historical surveies and whoagreed with the imperialists claims about reconstructing the Emperor.Footnote7 So in 1868 the new shogun handed over all his power to theEmperor in Kyoto. Shortly after passing over power to the Emperor, theEmperor Komeo died and was replaced by his boy who became the MeijiEmperor.

Footnote8 Because the Meiji Emperor was merely 15 all the powerof the new restored Emperor fell non in his custodies but alternatively in thecustodies of his close advisers. These advisors such as PrinceSaionji, Prince Konroe, and members of the Satsuma and Choshu kinswho had been members of the imperialist motion finally wound upaffecting into the Meiji Bureaucracy and Genro of the MeijiEra.Footnote9 Once in control of the authorities the Meiji Leaders andadvisers to the Emperor reversed their policy of ill will toForeigners.Footnote10 They did this because after Emperor Komeo ( whowas strongly opposed to reach with the West ) died in 1867 the MeijiEmperor & # 8217 ; s advisers were no longer bound by his Imperial Will.

Binganti-western besides no longer served the intents of the Meiji advisers.Originally it was a tool of the imperialist motion that was used toshow that the Shogun was non moving out the Imperial Will. Now thatthe Shogun and Komeo Emperor were dead there was no longer a ground totake on anti-foreign policies.The pick of the imperial thrown by the imperialists as apoint for Japan to beat up around could non hold been more wise.Although the imperial establishment had no existent power it had cosmopolitanentreaty to the Nipponese public. It was both a mythic and spiritual thoughtin their minds.Footnote11 It provided the Japanese in this clip ofpandemonium after coming in contact with aliens a belief in stableness( harmonizing to Nipponese myth the imperial line is a unbroken line of descenthanded down since clip immortal ) , and it provided a belief in thenatural high quality of Nipponese culture.

Footnote12 The symbolism ofthe Emperor helped guarantee the success of the restorationists becauseit undercut the legitimacy of the Shogunate & # 8217 ; s regulation, and itstrengthened the Meiji swayers who claimed to move for the Emperor.What is a great paradox about the Imperialist & # 8217 ; s claims toreconstruct the power of the Emperor is that the Meiji swayers did nonreconstruct the Emperor to power except symbolically because he was bothexcessively immature and his advisers to power hungry.Footnote13 By 1869 therelationship between the Emperor and his Meiji bureaucratism and theEmperor and the Tokugawa Shogun before the Restoration were reallysimilar. Both the Meiji Bureaucrats and the Shogun ruled under theauthorization of the Emperor but did non allow the Emperor make anydeterminations. In Japan the Emperor reigned but did non govern. Thiswas utile for the new Meiji administrative officials, it kept the Emperor a mythicand powerful symbol.Footnote14The traditions and symbols of Confucianism and the ImperialInstitution were already profoundly ingrained in the mind ofthe Nipponese but the new Meiji swayers through both an instructionsystem, and the construction of the Nipponese authorities were able toefficaciously instill these traditions into a new coevals ofNipponese. The instruction system the Meiji Oligarchy founded transformeditself into a system that indoctrinated pupils in the thoughts ofConfucianism and fear for the Emperor.

Footnote15 After the deceaseof Okubo in 1878 ; Ito, Okuma, and Iwakura emerged as the three mostpowerful figures among the immature administrative officials that were running theauthorities in the name of the Meiji Emperor. Iwakura one of the lonefigures in the ancient aristocracy to derive prominence among the Meijioligarchy allied with Ito who feared Okuma & # 8217 ; s progressive thoughts woulddestroy Japan & # 8217 ; s culture.Footnote16 Iwakura it is thought was ablepull strings the immature Emperor to turn concerned about the demand tostrengthen traditional ethical motives. Therefore in 1882 the Emperor issued theYogaku Koyo, the precursor of the Imperial Rescript onEducation.Footnote17 This papers put the accent of the Nipponeseinstruction system on a moral instruction from 1882 onward.Previous to 1880 the Japanese instruction system was modeled onthat of the Gallic instruction system.

After 1880 the Nipponese brieflymodeled their instruction system on the American system.Footnote18However, get downing with the Yogaku Koyo in 1882 and stoping with the1885 reorganisation of the section of Education along Prussianlines the American theoretical account was abolished. The new instruction curateMori Arinori after returning from Europe in 1885 with Ito wasconvinced that the Japanese instruction system had to hold a religiousfoundation to it.Footnote19 In Prussia Arinori saw that foundation tobe Christianity and he decreed that in Japan the Education system wasto be based on fear for the Imperial Institution. A image ofthe Emperor was placed in every schoolroom, kids read about themyths environing the Emperor in school, and they learned that theEmperor was the caput of the elephantine household of Japan.Footnote20 By theclip the Imperial Rescript on Education was decreed by the Emperor in1889 the Japanese instruction system had already begun to transformitself into a system that did non learn how to believe but alternatively whatto believe. The Imperial Rescript on Education in 1889 was harmonizing toNipponese bookmans such as Hugh Borton, & # 8220 ; the nervus axis of the neworder.

& # 8221 ; Footnote21 Burton believes that the Imperial Rescript onEducation signaled the rise of chauvinistic elements in Japan. TheImperial Rescript on Education was the apogee of this wholemotion to the right. The Rescript emphasized trueness and filialpiousness, regard for the fundamental law and preparedness to function theauthorities.

It besides exalted the Emperor as the contemporary between Edenand earth.Footnote22The Constitution of 1889 like the alterations in the instructionsystem helped beef up fear for the Imperial Institution.The 1889 fundamental law was truly the 2nd papers of its sortpassed in Japan the first being the Imperial Oath of 1868 in which theEmperor laid out the construction and who was to head the new Meijigovernment.Footnote23 This Imperial Oath was refereed to as afundamental law at the clip but it merely really mistily laid out theconstruction of authorities. The fundamental law promulgated by the Emperorin 1889 did much more so put out the construction of Nipponeseauthorities it besides affirmed that the Emperor was the supreme crowned headover Japan.Footnote24 The sign language ceremonial itself was an auspiciousevent on the manner to it Mori Arinori one of the moderate leaders of theMeiji authorities was attacked and killed by a deranged right-winger.Footnote25 The ceremonial itself evoked both the yesteryear and nowadays andwas symbolic of the Meiji authoritiess switch toward the right and theauthoritiess usage of the Emperor as supreme swayer. Before subscribing thepapers Emperor Meiji prayed at the castle sanctuary to continue thename of his imperial ascendants he so signed the fundamental law whichaffirmed the holiness of the Emperor & # 8217 ; s rubric ( Tenno Taiken ) , and hisright to do or abrogate any law.

Footnote26 The fundamental law besides setup a bicameral legislature.Footnote27 The fundamental law codified thepower of the Emperor and helped the Meiji oligarchy warrant their regulationbecause they could indicate to the fundamental law and say that they weretransporting out the will of the Emperor. The Meiji Emperor even after theFundamental law of 1889 enjoyed small existent power.

The Meiji Emperor didnon even come to cabinet meetings because his advisers told him if thecabinet made a determination that was different so the 1 he wanted sothat would make discord and would destruct the thought of theImperial Institution. So even after the Meiji Constitution the Emperorwas still preponderantly a symbol.Footnote28 The Constitution ingrainedin Nipponese society the thought that the authorities was being run byhigher forces who new better so the Nipponese people, it besidesbroadened the base of support of the Meiji Rulers who now had apapers excessively prove they were moving on Imperial Will and theirdeterminations were imperial determinations non those of mere mortals.Footnote29The symbolism of the Emperor and usage of Confucianism allowedthe Meiji swayers to accomplish their ends. One of their ends was theabolition of the system of feoffs and return of all land to theEmperor.

At foremost the new Meiji Rulers allied themselves with theDaimyo kins in resistance to the Tokugawa Shogun. But one time the Meijileaders had gained a control they saw that they would necessitate to get rid ofthe feoff system and dressed ore power in the custodies of a cardinalauthorities. The Meiji swayers achieved their ends by holding theChoshu, Satsuma, Tosa, and Hizen kins give up their lands, allowingthe Daimyos big pensions if they gave up their kins, and by holdingthe Emperor issue two edicts in July 1869, and August 1871.

Footnote30The function and symbolism of the Emperor although non the exclusive factor inact uponing the Daimyo to give up their feoffs, was critical. The MeijiOligarchs said that non turning in the feoff to the Emperor would bedisloyal and pointed to the historical record which Meiji bookmansclaimed showed that historically all feoffs were the belongings of theEmperor.Footnote31 They showed this by claiming that the Shogun wouldexchange the swayers of feoffs and this proved that the Daimyos did noncommand the rubric to their land but simply held it for the Emperor.

Imperial edicts and mottos of trueness to the Emperor besidesaccompanied the abolition of the Samurai system.Footnote32 In theabolition of both these feudal systems the symbolism of the Emperoras both the manager of the enterprise and receiver of the authorizationafterwards played a critical function in guaranting there success.Footnote33The abolition of feoffs and the samurai category were indispensablefor the stableness and industrialisation of Japan.

Footnote34 Withoutthe concentration of land and power in the custodies of the Meijioligarchs and the Emperor the Meiji oligarchs feared they wouldreceive resistance from powerful Daimyos and ne’er derive control andauthorization over all of Japan. Historical illustrations bear out the frights ofthe Meiji Oligarchy ; in 1467 the Ashikaga Shogun failed to commandmany of the feoffs and because of this a civil war raged inJapan.Footnote35 The centralisation of power allowed the Meijiauthorities to hold taxing authorization over all of Japan and prosecutenational projects.Footnote36 The integrity of Japan besides allowed the MeijiOligarchs to concentrate on national and non local issues.The usage of Confucianism and the Emperor besides brought a gradeof stableness to Japan during the disruptive Meiji old ages. The Emperor’smere presence on a train or in western apparels were plenty to convertthe populace of the safety or goodness of the Meiji oligarchy & # 8217 ; sindustrial policy.

In one celebrated case the Nipponese Emperorappeared in a train auto and after that siting trains became a commontopographic point activity in Japan. The behaviour of the Imperial household was besidescritical to acceptance of western cultural patterns. Before 1873 mostNipponese adult females of a high societal place would shave their superciliumsand melanize their dentitions to look beautiful. But on March 3rd 1873 theEmpress appeared in public have oning her ain superciliums and withunblackened dentitions. Following that twenty-four hours most adult females in Tokyo and aroundJapan stopped shaving their superciliums and melanizing theirteeth.Footnote37 The Imperial establishment provided both a cardinal tool toalteration Nipponese civilization and feelings about industrialisation and itprovided stableness to Japan which was critical to letingindustrialists to put in mills and increase exports andproduction.

Footnote38The symbols and the traditions the Meiji leaders inculcatedNipponese society with helped the Meiji authorities maintain stablenessand prosecute its economic policies but it besides had terrible restrictionsthat limited the radical range of the Nipponese authorities andhelped convey about the ruin of the Meiji epoch. The usage ofConfucianism and the Emperor to bolster the Imperial Restoration laidthe foundation for a paradox of province personal businesss. The system that soughtto beef up Japan through the usage of modern engineering and modernorganisation methods was utilizing traditional values to foster itsgoals.Footnote39 This caused some to turn toward the West for the& # 8220 ; enlightenment & # 8221 ; the Meiji epoch promised this was the instance with Okumawho was finally forced out of the increasing patriotGenro.Footnote40 For others it lead them to severe patriotismrejecting all that was western. This was such the instance of Saigo whobelieved till his decease on his ain blade that the Meiji leaders werehypocritical and were go againsting the Imperial Will by negociating andtrading with the west.

Footnote41 The Meiji authorities used the samesymbols and traditions that the Tokugawa used and like the Tokugawagave the Emperor no determination doing power. The Meiji Emperor althoughhe had supreme power as accorded in the fundamental law ne’er reallymade determinations but was alternatively a pawn of the Meiji Genro who claimedto transport out his Imperial Will. This Imperial Will they decided forthemselves. Like the Shogunate the Meiji authoritiess claim to govern forthe Emperor was fraught with jobs. The Imperial Will was a fluidthought that could be adopted by different parties under alteringfortunes.

And merely like the Meiji swayers were able to tumble theShogun by claiming successfully that they were the true decision makersof the Imperial Will ; the warmonger elements in the 1930 & # 8217 ; s were ableto tumble the democratic elements of Japan partly by claiming themantle of governing for the Emperor.Footnote42 From this position theMeiji Oligarchs constructing up of the Imperial Myth was a fatal defect inthe authorities. The fundamental law which says in article I, & # 8220 ; The imperiumof Japan shall be governed over by a line of Emperors unbroken forages eternal & # 8221 ; gave to whoever was moving on the Imperial Will absoluteright to govern.Footnote43The symbols of the Emperor and the tradition of Confucianismdid non stop with the terminal of the Meiji epoch or universe war two.

Today thethought of filial piousness is still strong, multiple coevalss of a householdstill normally live together even in cramped Nipponese lodging. Thefaith of Shinto that the Meiji leaders rejuvenated during theirregulation in order to assist further the imperial cult is still booming asthe 1000s of Tori Gatess and Shrines around Japan attest.Footnote44But the most dramatic symbol to last is that of the Emperorstripped after universe war two of all power the Emperor of Japan isstill revered.

During the unwellness of Emperor Showa in 1989 everynational newspaper and telecasting show was full of studies related tothe Emperor & # 8217 ; s wellness. During the six months the Showa Emperor was illbefore he died all parades and public events were canceled in regardfor the Emperor. Outside the Gatess of the Imperial castle in Tokyolong tabular arraies were set up where people lined up to subscribe cards to wishthe Emperor a rapid recovery. The intelligence media even kept the type ofunwellness the emperor had a secret in respect to the Emperor.

At hisdecease after months of unwellness it was as if the Imperial Cult of theMeiji epoch had returned. Everything in Japan closed down, privatetelecasting Stationss went every bit far as to non aerate any commercials on thetwenty-four hours of his decease. And now about six old ages after his decease more sofour hundred and 50 thousand people trek yearly to the straysedate site of Emperor Showa.Footnote45The traditions and symbolism of Confucianism and the Emperorwere critical to the Meiji oligarchs deriving control of power andends of industrialisation. The oligarchy inculcated the Nipponesepublic with these traditional values through an instruction system thatstressed moral acquisition, and through a fundamental law that establishedthe jurisprudence of Japan to be that of the Imperial Will. The values ofConfucianism and symbol of the Emperor allowed the Meiji authorities topeaceable addition control of Japan by appealing to history and theRestoration of the Emperor. But the Meiji oligarchs ne’er reconstruct theEmperor to a place of existent political power. Alternatively he was used asa tool by the oligarchs to accomplish their modernisation programs in Japansuch as the abolition of feoffs, the terminal of the samurai, theextension of new cultural patterns, and pubic credence of theMeiji oligarchs industrialization policies.

The symbols and traditionsof Japan & # 8217 ; s yesteryear are an digesting bequest that have manifested themselvesin the Meiji Restoration and today in Japans continued fear forthe Emperor.& # 8212 ;Footnote1Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan( Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921 ) 47.Footnote2Takatsu Kuwasaburo, The History of The Empire of Japan ( Tokyo: DaiNippon Tosho Kabushiki Kwaisha, 1893 ) 206.Footnote3Ibid. , 17.Footnote4Edwin O.

Reischauer, Japan Past and Present ( Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing,1987 ) 112.Footnote5Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )32.Footnote6Shusuke Sato, Some Historical Phases of Modern Japan ( New York: JapanSociety, 1916 ) 4.Footnote7Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )44.

Footnote8Louis Allen, Japan the Years of Triumph ( London: Purnell and Sons,1971 ) 8.Footnote9David Titus, Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan ( New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1974 ) 55Footnote10Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton MifflinCompany, 1976 ) 73.Footnote11Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan( Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921 ) 142.

Footnote12Ibid. , 35.Footnote13Stephen Large, The Nipponese Constitutional of 1889 ( London:Suntory-Toyota International Centre, 1989 ) 27.Footnote14Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )70.

Footnote15Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton MifflinCompany, 1976 ) 116.Footnote16Ernest Best, Christian Faith and Cultural Crisis the Nipponese Case( Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1966 ) 108.Footnote17Ibid. , 105.Footnote18Ibid. , 106.

Footnote19Ibid. , 106.Footnote20Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton MifflinCompany, 1976 ) 117.Footnote21Hugh Borton, Japan & # 8217 ; s Modern Century ( New York: Ronald Press, 1955 )524.Footnote22Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton MifflinCompany, 1976 ) 118.

Footnote23Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )69.Footnote24Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan( Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921 ) 60.Footnote25Ian Nish, The Nipponese Constitutional of 1889 ( London: Suntory-ToyotaInternational Centre, 1989 ) 9.Footnote26Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )193.

Footnote27Ibid. , 192.Footnote28Stephen Large, The Nipponese Constitutional of 1889 ( London:Suntory-Toyota International Centre, 1989 ) 27.Footnote29Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan( Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921 ) 89.Footnote30Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )77.Footnote31Ibid. , 78.

Footnote32Ibid. , 77.Footnote33Ibid. , 83.Footnote34Ibid. , 82.

Footnote35Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present ( Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing,1987 ) 66.Footnote36Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton MifflinCompany, 1976 ) 117.Footnote37Louis Allen, Japan the Years of Triumph ( London: Purnell and Sons,1971 ) 41.Footnote38Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton MifflinCompany, 1976 ) 84.Footnote39Ibid. , 119.Footnote40Ibid.

, 88.Footnote41Ibid. , 94-95.

Footnote42Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present ( Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing,1987 ) 166.Footnote43Ibid. , 167.Footnote44Ibid. , 13.Footnote45Stephen Large, The Nipponese Constitutional of 1889 ( London:Suntory-Toyota International Centre, 1989 ) 20.BibliographyFootnote1Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan( Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921 ) 47.

Footnote2Takatsu Kuwasaburo, The History of The Empire of Japan ( Tokyo: DaiNippon Tosho Kabushiki Kwaisha, 1893 ) 206.Footnote3Ibid. , 17.Footnote4Edwin O.

Reischauer, Japan Past and Present ( Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing,1987 ) 112.Footnote5Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )32.Footnote6Shusuke Sato, Some Historical Phases of Modern Japan ( New York: JapanSociety, 1916 ) 4.Footnote7Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )44.

Footnote8Louis Allen, Japan the Years of Triumph ( London: Purnell and Sons,1971 ) 8.Footnote9David Titus, Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan ( New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1974 ) 55Footnote10Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton MifflinCompany, 1976 ) 73.Footnote11Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan( Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921 ) 142.Footnote12Ibid. , 35.

Footnote13Stephen Large, The Nipponese Constitutional of 1889 ( London:Suntory-Toyota International Centre, 1989 ) 27.Footnote14Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )70.Footnote15Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton MifflinCompany, 1976 ) 116.Footnote16Ernest Best, Christian Faith and Cultural Crisis the Nipponese Case( Leiden: E.

J. Brill, 1966 ) 108.Footnote17Ibid. , 105.Footnote18Ibid. , 106.Footnote19Ibid. , 106.

Footnote20Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton MifflinCompany, 1976 ) 117.Footnote21Hugh Borton, Japan & # 8217 ; s Modern Century ( New York: Ronald Press, 1955 )524.Footnote22Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton MifflinCompany, 1976 ) 118.Footnote23Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )69.Footnote24Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan( Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921 ) 60.Footnote25Ian Nish, The Nipponese Constitutional of 1889 ( London: Suntory-ToyotaInternational Centre, 1989 ) 9.

Footnote26Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )193.Footnote27Ibid. , 192.Footnote28Stephen Large, The Nipponese Constitutional of 1889 ( London:Suntory-Toyota International Centre, 1989 ) 27.Footnote29Hidejiro Nagata, A Simplified Treatise on The Imperial House of Japan( Tokyo: Hakubunkwan, 1921 ) 89.Footnote30Walter McLaren, A Political History of Japan During the Meiji Era1867-1912 ( New York: Scribner and Sons, 1916 )77.Footnote31Ibid. , 78.

Footnote32Ibid. , 77.Footnote33Ibid. , 83.Footnote34Ibid. , 82.Footnote35Edwin O.

Reischauer, Japan Past and Present ( Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing,1987 ) 66.Footnote36Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton MifflinCompany, 1976 ) 117.Footnote37Louis Allen, Japan the Years of Triumph ( London: Purnell and Sons,1971 ) 41.Footnote38Peter Duus, The Rise of Modern Japan ( Boston: Houghton MifflinCompany, 1976 ) 84.Footnote39Ibid.

, 119.Footnote40Ibid. , 88.Footnote41Ibid. , 94-95.Footnote42Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan Past and Present ( Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing,1987 ) 166.Footnote43Ibid.

, 167.Footnote44Ibid. , 13.Footnote45Stephen Large, The Nipponese Constitutional of 1889 ( London:Suntory-Toyota International Centre, 1989 ) 20.

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