Sulkowski Essay, Research PaperFrom SULKOM @ ubvms.
cc.buffalo.edu Wed Feb 9 19:00:49 1994Received: from ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu by ponyexpress.princeton.
edu ( 5.65c/1.113/newPE ) Idaho AA08661 ; Wed, 9 Feb 1994 19:00:47 -0500Received: from ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu by ubvms.cc.
buffalo.edu ( PMDF V4.2-14 # 5889 ) Idaho ; Wed, 9 Feb 1994 18:55:43 ESTDate: Wed, 09 Feb 1994 18:55:43 -0500 ( EST ) From: Mark Sulkowski Subject: personalTo: bdcaplan @ phoenixMessage-Id: Organization: University at BuffaloX-Vms-To: IN % & # 8221 ; bdcaplan @ phoenix.Princeton.edu & # 8221 ; Mime-Version: 1.
0Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN ; CHARSET=US-ASCIIContent-Transfer-Encoding: 7BITStatus: Roentgen To: Bryan Douglas Caplan I posted this message earlier: & gt ; & gt ; 1. The morality-math analogy. I & # 8217 ; m non certain why Sulkowski places & gt ; & gt ; sole accent on my mathematics illustration ; if you recall my original & gt ; & gt ; poster, I besides adduced two unquestionably non-mathematical cases of the & gt ; & gt ; usage of direct reason. & gt ; & gt ; That & # 8217 ; s correct.
I do retrieve that. However, you specifically & gt ; stated that since direct ground worked for you in math, so there was & gt ; no ground to say it didn & # 8217 ; t work in morality & # 8212 ; a claim I dispute. & gt ; & gt ; [ … .
.. … …
. ] & gt ; As to your inquiry of whether doctrine fails without direct & gt ; ground, I will province once more that I am non rather certain what you believe & gt ; direct ground to be. Philosophy relies on conceptual thought and & gt ; ( hopefully ) perceptual grounds.
What else is necessary? In instance you responded to this already, I didn & # 8217 ; t acquire the response.My history has been make fulling up on juncture. If you still have a transcript ofit, direct it to me in electronic mail.
If you haven & # 8217 ; t posted it yet, direct me acarbon transcript in electronic mail. Thankss! Mark | & # 8220 ; Simplicity and truth of character are non produced by theAndrew | restraint of Torahs, nor by the authorization of the province, andSulkowski | perfectly no 1 can be forced or legislated into a province | of beatitude ; the agencies required are faithful and brotherlySec/Treas | warning, sound instruction, and, above all, free usage of the NFLP | single judgment. & # 8221 ; & # 8212 ; SpinozaFrom slagle @ sgi417.
msd.lmsc.lockheed.com Thu Feb 10 09:52:12 1994Received: from eagle.is.lmsc.lockheed.
com by ponyexpress.princeton.edu ( 5.65c/1.
113/newPE ) Idaho AA10858 ; Thu, 10 Feb 1994 09:52:10 -0500Received: from sgi417.msd.lmsc.lockheed.
com by eagle.is.lmsc.lockheed.com ( 5.
65/Ultrix4.3-C ) Idaho AA06464 ; Thu, 10 Feb 1994 06:50:12 -0800Received: by sgi417.msd.lmsc.lockheed.com ( 920110.SGI/911001.SGI ) for bdcaplan @ phoenix.
Princeton.EDU Idaho AA03907 ; Thu, 10 Feb 94 06:51:59 -0800Date: Thu, 10 Feb 94 06:51:59 -0800From: slagle @ sgi417.msd.lmsc.lockheed.
com ( Mark Slagle ) Message-Id: To: bdcaplan @ phoenixCc: libernet-d @ Dartmouth.EDUIn-Reply-To: Bryan Douglas Caplan & # 8217 ; s message of Sun, 6 Feb 94 21:51:18 ESTSubject: Questions About Direct Reason AnsweredReply-To: slagle @ lmsc.lockheed.comStatus: RBryan Douglas Caplan writes: & gt ; Mark Sulkowski & # 8217 ; s latest answer leaves me with the feeling that I should & gt ; make a batch more work to do my place clear, and I am happy to make so. & gt ; 1. What is direct ground? Well, I read your whole account, and I & # 8217 ; m afraid I don & # 8217 ; t findthe affair any more clear than earlier. In a nutshell, whatdistinguishes this & # 8220 ; direct ground & # 8221 ; of yours from garden varietyintuition, or from godly disclosure for that affair? And whyshould we regard it as any more trusty? =Mark & # 8212 ; -Mark E.
Slagle PO Box 61059slagle @ lmsc.lockheed.com Sunnyvale, CA 94088408-756-0895 USAFrom SULKOM @ ubvms.cc.
buffalo.edu Thu Feb 10 22:25:10 1994Received: from ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.
edu by ponyexpress.princeton.edu ( 5.
65c/1.113/newPE ) Idaho AA01939 ; Thu, 10 Feb 1994 22:25:08 -0500Received: from ubvms.cc.buffalo.
edu by ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu ( PMDF V4.2-14 # 5889 ) Idaho ; Thu, 10 Feb 1994 20:36:12 ESTDate: Thu, 10 Feb 1994 20:36:12 -0500 ( EST ) From: Mark Sulkowski Subject: personal: direct reasonTo: bdcaplan @ phoenixMessage-Id: Organization: University at BuffaloX-Vms-To: IN % & # 8221 ; bdcaplan @ phoenix.
Princeton.edu & # 8221 ; Mime-Version: 1.0Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN ; CHARSET=US-ASCIIContent-Transfer-Encoding: 7BITStatus: Roentgen From: Bryan Douglas Caplan & gt ; I & # 8217 ; m glad we & # 8217 ; re taking this to electronic mail, since it seems to hold gotten a small & gt ; technical.A *little* proficient? & gt ; And by the manner, hello.Hi at that place. Pleasure to speak with you. & gt ; 1. How does direct ground differ from garden assortment intuition? [ .
.. … ] & gt ; 2. How does direct ground differ from Godhead disclosure? [ ..
. ] Okay, this info was interesting but merely so you know you wereresponding to Mark Slagle, a different chap.I was inquiring you if you had responded to a old station of mine.Mr. Slagle may hold been reacting to that response of yours.
( Thisis acquiring a small confusing. ) Anyhow, I & # 8217 ; m non Certain that you wrote this response. All I knowis that my history filled up earlier this hebdomad and I might hold missedit. I pointed out to you that your construct of direct ground wasunclear to me. I believe I asked for some elucidation. Sending itto me through electronic mail is all right with me.
And now onto your response to Slagle. & gt ; 1. How does direct ground differ from garden assortment intuition? Well, & gt ; garden-variety intuition is one species of direct ground, I suppose.
You suppose? Then possibly you aren & # 8217 ; t really clear on what directreason is either. What are you clear on about it? & gt ; Besides, garden-variety intuition is likely less self-critical and & gt ; thoughtful than our better direct logical thinkings are ; that is, garden-variet & gt ; intuition is likely our knee-jerk reaction, whereas something known & gt ; good through direct ground is reached after contemplation and careful thought.Is this & # 8220 ; self-critical and thoughtful & # 8221 ; facet of successfullyapplying direct ground _part_of_ the module of direct ground, or is itsomething else ( possibly the most witting and volitional degree of ourchoice and ability to believe ) ? Since I am still ill-defined on what youimagine direct thought to be, this inquiry may look off-target to you. & gt ; 2. How does direct ground differ from Godhead disclosure? Well, I presume & gt ; that you don & # 8217 ; t believe in Godhead disclosure, and neither make I.
Okay. & gt ; Well, I think that looking & gt ; at a philosopher like Aquinas will cast a small visible radiation on this. & gt ; Basically, philosophers who believed in disclosure besides often & gt ; believed in & # 8220 ; the natural visible radiation of ground, & # 8221 ; which is likely yet & gt ; another equivalent word for direct reason.Possibly & # 8230 ; I & # 8217 ; m no bookman of Aquinas, but & # 8220 ; the natural lightof ground & # 8221 ; does non strike me as needfully holding anything to make withyour direct ground. Aquinas may merely hold had a good appreciationfor the ability of people to believe and larn about what they observe.I don & # 8217 ; t cognize of any statement of his that other signifiers ofreasoning are uncomplete without direct logical thinking ( or & # 8220 ; the naturallight of ground & # 8221 ; ) . & gt ; But what is it that & # 8217 ; s truly teasing you about direct ground? I suspect & gt ; that it is the popular but misguided impression that everything must be & gt ; & # 8221 ; proven. & # 8221 ; Maybe & # 8230 ; I don & # 8217 ; t demand that things be proven without a doubt.
We may ever endure some signifier of uncertainty about our beliefs. I merely wantan _explanation_ for a specific decision other than merely & # 8220 ; it & # 8217 ; s obvious! & # 8221 ; Possibly there are & # 8220 ; obvious & # 8221 ; beliefs. I place a high grade of confidenceon beliefs based on observations under sensible conditions of observation.For illustration, if I am moderately positive that I am awake and notdelusional, and I cross a street, and I see rather clearly and sharplythat a auto is traveling towards me with lifelessly velocity, so that is certainlyenough experimental grounds to convert me to leap out of the way.I & # 8217 ; m non certain how large a function constructs play here.
The feeling ofdanger may be geared into a really speedy and & # 8220 ; low degree & # 8221 ; rating ofthe gesture of objects. This feeling of danger might transport a feelingof & # 8220 ; obviousness & # 8221 ; .Perhaps the construct really forms afterwards. & # 8220 ; That auto couldhave killed me! & # 8221 ; However, at this point any & # 8220 ; obviousness & # 8221 ; of the natureof the state of affairs is of a different kind. Now that I have the clip tomore to the full and critically measure the state of affairs, I can convey to bearcertain thoughts like & # 8220 ; fast moving, heavy, solid objects can seriouslydamage human wellness & # 8221 ; . I can believe about other people who really arehurt earnestly by such objects. I can _explain_ why I think that itis obvious that I could hold been hurt.
I am non left shouting & # 8220 ; but it & # 8217 ; sobvious and evident & # 8221 ; as if that explained everything.Let me cognize how my conjectural state of affairs relates to direct ground, if at all. & gt ; But of class that can & # 8217 ; t be true, because first of all it & gt ; leads to an infinite reasoning backward, since you would so hold to turn out your & gt ; proofs, turn out the cogent evidence of your cogent evidence, and so on. And 2nd of all & gt ; it is impossible because a cogent evidence merely yields truth if its premises are & gt ; true, and therefore on hurting of disk shape some premises must be known without & gt ; proof.We necessitate some maxims, yes.
And this is a serious question. & gt ; Or possibly its because of the related impression that intuition is undependable & gt ; and must be & # 8220 ; formalized. & # 8221 ; Well & # 8230 ; backed up with something. & gt ; Haven & # 8217 ; T you of all time made an statement and found that another individual merely couldn & # 8217 ; t & gt ; & # 8221 ; acquire it? & # 8221 ; No ne’er. Yes, of course.
& gt ; If you clearly saw that the statement was valid, did it affair that the & gt ; other individual couldn & # 8217 ; t see it? Actually, yes. I & # 8217 ; vitamin D want to cognize what his premises/observations are.Maybe mine are incorrect or incomplete. & gt ; That & # 8217 ; s what I think about direct ground. I see that some things are true & gt ; objectively. And if other people don & # 8217 ; t see it, why should that agitate my & gt ; assurance? & gt ; & # 8211 ; BryanUnfortunately, this still doesn & # 8217 ; t do much to assist me understandwhat direct ground is.
I realize that you are seeking to work out the problemof happening end-points to proof. But the being of a job does notdemand that there already be a solution. Possibly we as worlds are doomedto some uncertainness about these most basic assumptions/axioms/end-points.Consider it occupation security for philosophers.Maybe the state of affairs is better than this and observation can playa large function in supplying a foundation for our beliefs. We so necessitate tounderstand how we get from Perceptions – & gt ; Concepts. This may requirea greater apprehension of the workings of our brain.
Perhaps that is what your direct ground is & # 8212 ; hardwired logicor construct use? Still, it would be nice to doublecheck theusefulness of that somehow. Mark | “Simplicity and truth of character are non produced by theAndrew | restraint of Torahs, nor by the authorization of the province, andSulkowski | perfectly no 1 can be forced or legislated into a province | of beatitude ; the agencies required are faithful and brotherlySec/Treas | warning, sound instruction, and, above all, free usage of the NFLP | single judgment.” — SpinozaFrom SULKOM @ ubvms.cc.buffalo.
edu Sun Feb 13 15:59:42 1994Received: from ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.
edu by ponyexpress.princeton.edu ( 5.65c/1.113/newPE ) Idaho AA16408 ; Sun, 13 Feb 1994 15:59:41 -0500Received: from ubvms.
cc.buffalo.edu by ubvms.
cc.buffalo.edu ( PMDF V4.
2-14 # 5889 ) Idaho ; Sun, 13 Feb 1994 15:59:26 ESTDate: Sun, 13 Feb 1994 15:59:26 -0500 ( EST ) From: Mark Sulkowski Subject: personal: direct reasonTo: bdcaplan @ phoenixMessage-Id: Organization: University at BuffaloX-Vms-To: IN % ”bdcaplan @ phoenix.Princeton.EDU”Mime-Version: 1.0Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN ; CHARSET=US-ASCIIContent-Transfer-Encoding: 7BITStatus: Roentgen From: Bryan Douglas Caplan > 2. Is direct ground necessarily/by definition “self-critical and > thoughtful” ? Now that is an interesting inquiry.
The reply is yes. > [ … ] if person thought carefully and > self-critically about a proposition and came to a decision, I would state > that direct ground is at work.
Okay. So direct ground can merely be used with mental attempt? > ( This is different from stating that they > are CORRECT, of class. But they have at least used an > in-principle-valid faculty.Okay. > But I go farther, and say that > sometimes we can cognize something beyond a sensible uncertainty without any > ”proof” at all.
That is, without any kind of deductive derivation.Okay. I suppose so. > Rather, sometimes we think about something, so see that it must be or > likely is true. As a paradigm illustration, take the proposition that the > statement ad hominem is a false belief. I don’t prove it ; instead I see that > it is true on its ain virtues, directly.I’d say that statement ad hominem is a false belief because itcontains a premiss about the nature of truth that is incorrect — thatthe character ( or whatever ) of the individual so attacked has a bearingon the truth of a logical statement.
Normally, this is non so.Of class, if it was the instance that the point of the argumentwas to turn out a individual has a bad character, or is ugly, or whatever, so the truth of the statement may be bound up with grounds to thiseffect.Do you think I am utilizing my direct ground here or non? > Indeed, the analogue between deductive/indirect ground and direct ground > extends here ; for merely as I sometimes know that a deductive statement is > PROBABLY right, so excessively do I sometimes know that an penetration of direct > ground is PROBABLY right. It’s non an all-or-none sort of thing. > Maybe the mistake that direct ground is supposed to be > infallible is what creates opposition to the impression? That’s portion of it. I’m softening in my positions to direct reasonnow that it seems more “human” and less God-like. > What makes observation so superior to the > mind that we should play down the mind every bit much as possible? I’m merely seeking to increase the chance that the intellectis paying attending to world and non merely conceive ofing it. It’s notthat I don’t value the mind ; it’s merely that I value observationas a “reality check”.
> In fact, if you re-read your statement, you will detect that even you turn > to the mind to warrant your observations ; for what determines what > conditions of observation are “reasonable” ? Surely non observation > itself, for so we would hold a round argument.Touche! > Is it obvious that a hurrying auto will ache you upon impact? Well, I > think that we are confounding psychological with epistemic > noticeability, here.I wanted to cognize your place on the matter. > 6.
What does this hold to make with morality? ( My inquiry, non yours. ) > Well, I think that direct ground can bridge the is-ought spread, and > nil else can. How can you get down with descriptive premises and acquire a > normative decision? You can’t unless you smuggle in a moral > premiss. If you deny the being of direct ground, you’re stuck. I > say that we come to cognize the moral premiss with direct ground. That > provides a non-circular account of moral cognition that I have ne’er > seen anyone else provide.
And an highly clear, clean, and simple > account, I might add.Well, this is the meat of the job. Can we discourse this? Could you do an ought statement and explicate how direct ground isinvolved? What moral premiss is being brought in? Besides, since you admit direct ground could be incorrect, how can weknow when it is? What grounds must be brought to bear ( eitherobservational or rational ) ? ( Are at that place any books published on the topic of direct ground? ) Mark | “Simplicity and truth of character are non produced by theAndrew | restraint of Torahs, nor by the authorization of the province, andSulkowski | perfectly no 1 can be forced or legislated into a province | of beatitude ; the agencies required are faithful and brotherlySec/Treas | warning, sound instruction, and, above all, free usage of the NFLP | single judgment.” — SpinozaFrom SULKOM @ ubvms.cc.
buffalo.edu Fri Feb 18 21:23:52 1994Received: from ubvmsb.cc.buffalo.edu by ponyexpress.
princeton.edu ( 5.65c/1.113/newPE ) Idaho AA03366 ; Fri, 18 Feb 1994 21:23:50 -0500Received: from ubvms.
cc.buffalo.edu by ubvms.
cc.buffalo.edu ( PMDF V4.2-14 # 5889 ) Idaho ; Fri, 18 Feb 1994 21:04:28 ESTDate: Fri, 18 Feb 1994 21:04:28 -0500 ( EST ) From: Mark Sulkowski Subject: personal: direct reasonTo: bdcaplan @ phoenixMessage-Id: Organization: University at BuffaloX-Vms-To: IN % ”bdcaplan @ phoenix.princeton.edu”Mime-Version: 1.0Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN ; CHARSET=US-ASCIIContent-Transfer-Encoding: 7BITStatus: Roentgen From: Bryan Douglas Caplan > What’s of import is that, on your history, you > deduce the fact that the statement ad hominem is a false belief from the nature > of truth.
And how do you come to larn about the nature of truth? THAT > is where direct ground is clearly coming in. If you re-read your account, > it is a authoritative instance of merely giving a clear statement of an apparent truth, > and trusting upon my direct ground to see that you are right. ( You are, of > class. ) I don’t see a cogent evidence ; I see a clear statement of a proposition which > you verify with the intellect. > So yes, I think you are utilizing your direct ground here.Okay.
Interesting. I’ll admit that you may be onto something here. > We need all of the double-checks we can acquire, fallible > animals that we are. But notice that it works both ways: the intellect > can function as a world cheque on OBSERVATION.Hmmm, I hadn’t idea of that. You’re right.
> But I would differ if you thought ( make you? ) that observation has veto power > over the mind, in the sense that we ever go with observation over > the mind when there is a struggle. I think that we must weigh the > several groundss provided, and make up one’s mind accordingly.I agree with you on this point. > Thus, when I decided that Rand’s proof of > morality was erroneous, and the path of direct ground was valid, there wasn’t > any exact minute when my head changed. I merely thought and re-thought the > inquiry, and bit by bit I came to a new place. Interesting.Indeed.
I’m still confused about what function direct logical thinking can play inmorality and moralss though. > a. “Happiness is good.” Well, I think about it and see that it is true.
? This is a perplexing one. I suppose there may be something deepwithin us that desires felicity. But *I* would prefer to understand howhappiness relates to our wellbeing. I’d instead non acquire into the trap ofconfusing merely any desire with our good. > Besides, I think about its antonym ( ”Happiness is evil” ) , which is absurd.Well, felicity would hold to be bad for us to be evil. There isno evident ground why this might be the instance, so I suppose your conclusionis sensible on the face of it.
> On a moral claim every bit basic as this, I’m non certain what more to state. Except: > other’s efforts to “prove” it are difficult to believe.For you possibly.
Actually, I think that we need more information about the brainto truly clinch statements like this. Ayn Rand drew her conclusionsfrom really simple abstractions of human nature. It doesn’t incorporateenough information to convert some people — at least given her seemingdemand for 100 % certainty about such things.So I’ll agree that Ayn Rand didn’t wholly convert me either, though I _do_ think that replies of this kind are possible without relyingTOO much on direct reason. > For illustration, you have > Rand’s effort to state that “life and felicity are merely two sides of the same > coin, ” and deduce the goodness of felicity from the value of life. Well, since > a suffering life is non merely possible but reasonably common, this statement isn’t > really convincing.I’m traveling to acquire finical and province that I don’t think you have quitecaptured her statement.
Possibly she didn’t explain herself really good in thepart you paraphrase, but she didn’t say that life=happiness. Rather, shebelieved that prosecuting and accomplishing nonsubjective values ( fulfilling existent, personal demands ) leads to happiness as a sort of psychological wages. Thisreward encourages us to populate farther because life feels like it is worthliving. Therefore, happiness Acts of the Apostless in the service of life ( felicity is good, QED ) .Of COURSE people can be unhappy, but so people can besides be quiteimmoral and still pull off to populate.
Ayn Rand would ne’er hold denied that. > It would be far better to confirm “A happy life is better > than an unhappy one” as an penetration of direct ground than to torturously argue > that “life” really “requires happiness” or something like that.Well, it’s better depending on what you are looking for. > Do you hold any peculiar moral claims in head? Well, how about “murder is immoral” ? What can be said about therole of direct ground here? Anyway, thanks for discoursing this with me so far.
I’ll admitthat direct ground does non look rather as bogus to me as it did at thestart.Mark | “It does me no hurt for my neighbour to state there are twentyAndrew | Gods or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor interruptions my leg.”Sulkowski | — Thomas Jefferson31a